Differential Object Marking in Kristang, An Endangered Creole in Singapore

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An Honours Thesis submitted in part fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Bachelor of Arts with Honours in English Language

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This Honours Thesis represents my own work and due acknowledgement is given whenever information is derived from other sources. No part of this Honours Thesis has been or is being concurrently submitted for any other qualification at any other university.

KEVIN MARTENS WONG ZHI QIANG
1 NOVEMBER 2016
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
KUNG GRANDI MERSEH


Yo pun mistih dah merseh kung yo sa konselu, Mitcho. Chuma Bernard sempri gostah falah: “Wah, bos sa konselu chadu ah!” Chadu mbes, kung ngua kunisang mutu bong. Astantu bos ja judah, dah kung yo tantu intindemintu, sempri kung mutu tantu pasensa kung alegría. Yo nadi skiseh bos sa mang lagreza kung apoyu. Mutu grandi merseh, retu retu. I’m also immensely grateful to Coppe van Urk and Ted Levin, who first introduced me to Distinctness, Joey McFarland, whose meticulous proof-reading caught me twice saying “intransitive” instead of “ditransitive”, and to other friends, tutors and mentors in ELL and linguistics who cheered me on by asking me (throughout the semester) variations on the question “so you’ve submitted, right?” — Andre Joseph Theng, Faiz Rosli, Keith Jayden Fernandez, Loh Kai Ying, Mie Hiramoto, Nala Huiying Lee, Rebecca Starr and Rowland Anthony Imperial.


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## CONTENTS

| List of tables and figures | vi |
| List of abbreviations      | vii|
| Abstract                  | xi |

### Chapter 1  Kristang in Singapore  

1.1 General introduction  
1.2 Introduction to Kristang in Singapore  
1.3 Variation  

### Chapter 2  kung  

2.1 Introduction and background to ku/kung  
2.2 Direct object kung  
2.3 Indirect object kung  
2.4 Summary and research questions  

### Chapter 3  Distinctness  

3.1 Background to Distinctness and relevance to kung  
3.2 Introduction to Distinctness  
3.3 Distinctness and Differential Object Marking
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter 4</th>
<th>Distinctness and <em>kung</em> in Kristang</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>Distinctness and transitive <em>kung</em>-marking in Kristang</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>Distinctness and ditransitive <em>kung</em>-marking in Kristang</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>Limitations on Distinctness</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>Summary</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter 5</th>
<th>General limitations</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>Variation</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>Community empowerment</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Bibliography | 64 |
# Lists of Tables and Figures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Table 1: Realization of <em>kung</em> as direct object marker</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 2: Ditransitive <em>kung</em>-marking in Kristang</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 3: Distinctness and appearance of <em>a</em> in Spanish</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 4: Distinctness and appearance of <em>kung</em> in Kristang</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(F)</th>
<th>feminine</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(M)</td>
<td>masculine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1PL</td>
<td>first person plural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1SG</td>
<td>first person singular</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2PL</td>
<td>second person plural</td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>3PL</td>
<td>third person plural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3SG</td>
<td>third person singular</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACC</td>
<td>accusative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPL</td>
<td>applicative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ApplP</td>
<td>applicative phrase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BEN</td>
<td>benefactive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BF</td>
<td><em>Peskisa</em> collaborator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>complementizer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CA</td>
<td><em>Peskisa</em> collaborator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP</td>
<td>complementizer phrase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COM</td>
<td>comitative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONJ</td>
<td>conjunction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAT</td>
<td>dative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DC</td>
<td><em>Peskisa</em> collaborator</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Kristang

The language also variously known as Kristang, Papiá Kristang, Papia Cristang, Cristang, Papia, Papia Cristao, Serani, Bahasa Serani, Portugis, Português de Malaca, Malaccan Portuguese, Malacca Creole, Malacca Creole Portuguese, Seranor Malacca Creole Portuguese, Bahasa Geragau, Luso-Malay, Malaccan,
Malaqueiro, Malaquenho, Malaquense, Malaquês and/or Malayo-Portuguese

The object marker also observed being realized as *ku*

Linear Correspondence Axiom

iso 639-3 code for Kristang

noun

noun phrase

grammatical sentence (appears only on examples with contested grammaticality)

*Peskisa*  *Peskisa di Papia Kristang na Singapura*

('Documentation of the Kristang Language in Singapore Project')

preposition

phonetic form / phonological form

Phase Impenetrability Condition

prepositional phrase

postnominal

prenominal

preterite

progressive

past

specifier
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Symbol</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>T</td>
<td>tense / inflection (INFL)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TP</td>
<td>tense / inflection (INFL) phrase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>verb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v</td>
<td>light verb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vc</td>
<td>light verb-complement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vcp</td>
<td>light verb-complement phrase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VP</td>
<td>verb phrase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vP</td>
<td>light verb phrase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>φ</td>
<td>feature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>φP</td>
<td>featurial phrase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*</td>
<td>ungrammatical sentence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*(x)</td>
<td>sentence is ungrammatical when x is omitted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*(x)</td>
<td>sentence is ungrammatical when x is included</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>?</td>
<td>sentence with unclear grammaticality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>?(x)</td>
<td>sentence has unclear grammaticality when x is omitted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>?(x)</td>
<td>sentence has unclear grammaticality when x is included</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ø</td>
<td>empty category</td>
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</table>
ABSTRACT

Kristang is an underdocumented and highly endangered creole language spoken in Singapore. Singapore Kristang has received almost no attention in the literature despite general awareness of its existence dating back to Schuhardt (1889); this paper presents new data from fieldwork on Kristang in Singapore in 2016 concerning differential object marking.

Kristang possesses a differential object marker, kung, that functions differently in transitive and ditransitive contexts. In transitive sentences, kung-realization appears to pattern on an animacy scale: it obligatorily marks human animates, and is dispreferred on other nouns. In ditransitive sentences, kung-realization instead occurs solely on indirect objects, with optional realization when the indirect object precedes the direct object, and obligatory realization when the indirect object follows the direct object. Additionally and contrary to earlier documentation of the language under Baxter (1988), 2016 fieldwork data in Singapore shows that transitive kung-realization is no longer predicated on object specificity, and that in ditransitives, kung-realization on the direct object as well as the indirect object is dispreferred.
Beginning with a brief description of Kristang’s status in Singapore and ongoing documentation efforts, I proceed to describe these patterns of *kung*-realization as observed in 2016 fieldwork data, before using Richards (2010)’s theory of Distinctness to provide a formal syntactic account for the differences in transitive and ditransitive *kung*-marking. I show that a Distinctness-based analysis is able to provisionally capture these differences, and explains why animacy is only salient in transitive marking. However, additional adverb intervention data suggests that this analysis is limited, and further investigation may be required before Distinctness can be conclusively said to provide a fully adequate explanation for these phenomena. I conclude with a brief exploration of some limitations raised by the endangered and fragmented state of contemporary Kristang, and the ethical implications of fieldwork with the Singapore Kristang-speaking community.
CHAPTER 1
KRISTANG IN SINGAPORE

1.1 GENERAL INTRODUCTION

This paper describes differential object marking in the contemporary Singapore variety of Kristang, an underdocumented and critically endangered creole language, and attempts to provide a stronger understanding of a number of phenomena associated with such marking through formal syntactic analysis.

Kristang possesses a differential object marker known as \textit{kung} (or \textit{ku}) that obligatorily precedes human animate direct objects in transitive sentences. However, in ditransitive constructions, \textit{kung} obligatorily precedes indirect objects regardless of animacy when the indirect object follows the direct object, and optionally precedes indirect objects when the indirect object precedes the direct object; realization of \textit{kung} on the direct object is dispreferred in all cases regardless of animacy. In this paper, I thus seek to understand why \textit{kung} is realized in such different fashion in transitive and ditransitive sentences, using the following research questions as a guide:

- Research Question 1: Why does \textit{kung} mark the direct object in transitive sentences but the indirect object in ditransitive sentences?
- Research Question 2: Why is indirect object \textit{kung} marking obligatory in DO IO ditransitive constructions but optional in IO DO ditransitive constructions?
• Research Question 3: Why does direct object *kung* operate on an animacy scale where indirect object *kung* does not?

• Research Question 4: Can these phenomena be accounted for using formal syntactic analysis?

I begin in Chapter 1 with a brief introduction to Kristang and ongoing documentation efforts in Singapore; Chapter 2 then describes the relevant transitive and ditransitive data gained from said documentation. Chapter 3 introduces Richards (2010)’s theory of Distinctness, whose appeal stems from its ability to provide a strong explanation for why ditransitive *kung*-marking does not follow animacy restrictions that govern transitive *kung*-marking. Distinctness provides the major theoretical framework for the analysis of the transitive and ditransitive data, which is then detailed in Chapter 4. I conclude in Chapter 5 with an exploration of the limitations imposed by the present-day status of Kristang in Singapore, and the ethical concerns I had while interviewing and collaborating with members of the Kristang-speaking community.

1.2 INTRODUCTION TO KRISTANG IN SINGAPORE

Kristang, Papiá Kristang, Papia Cristang, Cristang, Papia, Papia Cristao, Serani, Bahasa Serani, Portugis, Português de Malaca, Malaccan Portuguese, Malacca Creole, Malacca Creole Portuguese, Seranor Malacca Creole Portuguese, Bahasa Geragau, Luso-Malay, Malaccan, Malaqueiro, Malaqueno, Malaquense, Malaquês or Malayo-Portuguese (iso 639-3:mcm) is an endangered creole language spoken primarily in Malacca and Singapore, with a number of diaspora communities in Kuala Lumpur and Penang in Malaysia, Perth in Australia, the
United Kingdom, Canada and elsewhere (Byrne 2011: 147). The name(s) of the language remain contested, with different speakers recognizing and condemning different names for the language for various historical, ethnic and political reasons. In this paper, without prejudice to any party, the language will be referred to as Kristang for the reader’s convenience.

Kristang was formerly a contact variety with Portuguese as the main lexifier of its vocabulary and strong substratal influence from Malay and possibly Hokkien (Alan Norman Baxter, personal communication, September 15, 2016), with additional influence from Konkani, Hakka, Dutch, English, Malayalam and other Southern Dravidian languages, and Indian varieties of Creole Portuguese, among others (Baxter & de Silva 2004: vii, Baxter & Bastos 2012).

Estimates of the remaining number of Kristang speakers vary widely, with little to no institutional statistical data collected in either Malacca or Singapore (Baxter 2005: 15-6); however, a current combined speaker population of about 1,000 individuals or less is generally accepted by most researchers, with around 750 speakers in Malacca, less than 100 speakers in Singapore, and a small number of speakers in the diaspora communities (Baxter 2005: 16, 2010: 121, 2012: 121-3, Wong 2017). In both Malacca (Baxter 2005: 16) and Singapore (Wong 2017), intergenerational transmission of the language appears to have ceased almost entirely, and most remaining fluent speakers are believed to be over 50 years of age; recognition of the language’s critically endangered status is almost undisputed and has been described as such for over twenty years (Baxter 1988, Rappa & Gupta 1995: 6,
Kristang arrived in Singapore in the 1820s with a large influx of Eurasian immigrants from Malacca, who sought better economic prospects and opportunities in the new Straits Settlements colony (Pereira 2006: 15-6, 2016: 18-21). This resulted in a Kristang-speaking community large enough for the variety of the language spoken in Singapore to have been recognised by Schuhardt (1889) as a distinct variety of Creole Portuguese. However, in modern-day Singapore, Kristang is almost entirely moribund, and little recognition exists that it has ever been a significant part of the island's history. There have been no newspapers, radio broadcasts, television programmes or other publications in Kristang other than Scully & Zuzarte (2004)'s dictionary, and no data collected on the language or its speakers by either the British or the subsequent People's Action Party governments. There has also been almost no serious scholarly study of the Singapore variety of Kristang since Schuhardt (1889), with Rappa & Gupta (1995)'s use of it in a case study on language death possibly the only example of this in the succeeding 127 years. Indeed, contemporary studies of language use and linguistic identity among Singapore Eurasians, such as Wee (2002), fail to mention the language entirely.

Hence, the data in this paper originates from the Peskisa di Papia Kristang na Singapura ‘Documentation of the Kristang Language in Singapore Project’, which was initiated to address this severe and long-standing gap in documentation and the literature on Kristang in Singapore. I am a researcher of Portuguese-Eurasian descent and was able to utilise my
connections and networks within the Portuguese-Eurasian community in Singapore to locate remaining speakers of Kristang in the country, and documented 14 Singaporean speakers of Kristang, with an additional 5 speakers who declined participation in the research.

1.3 VARIATION

There is much to suggest that the variety of Kristang in Singapore has developed features distinct from the variety of the language spoken in Malacca. Indeed, it must here be noted that the *Peskisa* has already documented significant phonological and syntactic variation in and between Kristang in Singapore, based on *Peskisa* data, and Kristang in Malacca, based on Baxter (1988) and succeeding work, and personal communication with Malaccan Kristang speakers. This is likely the result of a confluence of multiple factors, including an accelerated rate of change due to Kristang’s obsolescing status (Palosaari & Campbell 2011: 111), rapid language shift (Woodbury 2011: 180) and a “fraying-out” of the language as a result of “increasing contact patterns” between Kristang and other languages such as English and Malay (Schreier 2016: 217), political separation of the two locales, and city-wide dispersal of the remaining Kristang speakers in Singapore as a result of the country’s 1989 Ethnic Integration Policy. Given this, it is perhaps unsurprising that many *Peskisa* collaborators often presented conflicting grammaticality judgements between themselves, and in comparison with Baxter (1988), a grammar of Kristang based on Baxter’s fieldwork with Malaccan collaborators. It must also be noted, however, that during formal elicitation, the majority of *Peskisa* collaborators also altered or refuted grammaticality judgements they themselves had made sometimes minutes earlier.
Such variation can be a major challenge for researchers accustomed to more "linguistically homogenous" settings (Ansaldo 2009: 88) and so-called ‘enlightened’ fieldwork collaborators: indeed, Baxter (personal communication, April 1, 2016) observes that in the particular context of Kristang there is

the difficulty of introspection / grammatical evaluation by naïve informants. Perhaps eight or nine times out of ten, I have always found that speaker evaluation with Kristang is not very secure.

However, in dealing with such consistent and systematic variation, Dorian (1994) argues that the researcher should still recognise such variation and incorporate it into one’s analysis; she notes that

discovering the existence of personal-pattern variation requires that the fieldworker have multiple sources...by its very nature any investigation of such variation will call for work with a good many sources and the gathering of copious data from most of them. (Dorian 1994: 687)

Baxter (personal communication, April 1, 2016) similarly goes on to observe that his solution to his above Kristang-specific problem “was to record a huge amount of speech from a wide selection of speakers in different age-groups”.

Thus, although this study was constrained by access to speakers and time, the bulk of the data in this paper was collected from 3 Peskisa collaborators (referred to where necessary as BF, CA and DC) who were confident enough in the language to provide grammaticality judgements, who were able to provide 85 or more lexemes on a 100-lexeme Kristang
Swadesh word list, and who could read and write Kristang in spite of significant orthographic variation. For comparison with the better-documented and more well-known Malaccan variety of Kristang, supporting data is drawn from Baxter (1988).

As will be seen, BF, CA and DC demonstrated remarkable relative consistency in their realization of the linguistic feature of focus in this paper, the particle *kung*, realization that also consistently contradicted Baxter (1988)’s documentation and analysis. Nonetheless, all three collaborators still produced significant internal variation during elicitation. As Dorian (2009) cogently observes,

> if the speech community tolerates, or even embraces, a considerable amount of familial or idiosyncratic variation...the researcher may unknowingly take the forms he has recorded to be much more generally representative of a local speech form than they actually are.

To avoid such accidental misrepresentation, therefore, all instances of variation regarding particular syntactic constructions have been clearly indicated for the reader in this paper.

Chapter 2 now proceeds to discuss the particle *kung* in Kristang, and the patterns of realization that have been observed with it in transitive and ditransitive sentences.
CHAPTER 2

KUNG

2.1 INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND TO KU/KUNG

In Kristang, human animate direct objects are preceded by a particle known as *ku* or *kung*.

(2-01) yo dali ku/kung eli

1SG hit ACC 3SG

“I hit him.”

This same *ku* or *kung* particle also appears in ditransitive sentences, but now mostly on indirect objects. In this paper, I will gloss *kung* as accusative (ACC) when on a direct object, as in (2-01) above, and as dative (DAT) when on an indirect object, as in (2-02) below.

(2-02) yo ja dah mel ku/kung Joan

1SG PST give honey DAT Joan

“I gave honey to Joan.”

*ku/kung* is also either homophonous or identical to the comitative marker *kung* ‘with’ and the variant *kung* of the conjunctive *kon* ‘and’ (both of which accusative *kung* is likely related to) as seen in (2-03) for comitative *kung* and (2-04) for conjunctive *kung*. All of these are likely related to each other and are likely descended in some way from the Portuguese
comitative marker *com*, as ambiguity does occur in both (2-03) and (2-04), where collaborators note that both comitative and conjunctive readings are possible.

(2-03) *ki*  *bos ja*  kantah kung Ani

what 2SG PST sing  COM Ani

“What did you sing with Ani?”

“What did you sing to Ani?”

(2-04) *ki*  *bos ta*  kantah kung Kevin kung Mathias

what 2SG PROG sing  COM Kevin CONJ Mathias

“What are you singing with Kevin and Mathias?”

“What are you singing to Kevin and Mathias?”

Work remains to be done on comitative and conjunctive *ku/kung/?kon*; this paper focuses on the aforementioned accusative and dative readings of *ku/kung*.

Additionally, in the seminal reference grammar of Baxter (1988: 151-60), this marker only appears as *ku*; *kung* appears to be a variant of *ku* that may be unique to the Singapore variety. Some Singapore-based collaborators, for example, do not recognise *ku*, and only recognise nominal *ku* ‘buttocks’.


For simplicity and the reader’s benefit, accusative and dative ku/kung will henceforth be referred to in this paper as kung. This includes examples from other published sources where the particle is referred to ku, which have been standardized for the purposes of this paper as kung. The spelling of other words has been further regularized according to the orthography suggested by Baxter & de Silva (2004).

I now first describe direct object kung, before proceeding to explore indirect object kung in some detail.

2.2 DIRECT OBJECT KUNG

As first described by Baxter (1988: 152), the overt appearance of direct object kung appears to follow an animacy scale, where there is obligatory overt realization of kung for pronouns, proper names, optional overt realization of kung for most other human animate objects, and no overt realization of kung for lesser and inanimate objects.

(2-06) eli gostah *(kung) yo/Joan

3sg like acc 1sg/Joan

“She likes me/Joan.”
(2-07) eli gostah *(kung) akeh krengkrensa

3SG like ACC DET children

“She likes those children.”

(Baxter 1988: 103; kung-absent grammaticality judgement from 2016 fieldwork)

(2-08) eli gostah (*/?kung) kachoru

3SG like ACC dog

*/?“He likes dogs.”

(Baxter 1988: 154; kung-absent grammaticality judgement from 2016 fieldwork)

(2-09) kal jenti ngka gostah (*kung) figu

some person NEG like ACC banana

“Some people don’t like bananas.”

(Baxter 1988: 47; kung-present grammaticality judgement from 2016 fieldwork))

Thus, kung precedes yo, Joan and akeh krengkrensa in (2-06) and (2-07) because these denote specific human referents. kung is instead dispreferred in (2-08) because kachoru is an animal, and is lower on the animacy scale, and kung is absent entirely in (2-09) because figu is a plant (or a non-living thing, having been removed from the tree).

Within the category of human direct objects that are not pronouns or human proper names, overt realization of direct object kung is further governed by the definiteness of the human direct object in question. Overt realization of kung is preferred with “kin terms, proper
names of supernatural beings and human common names of definite reference” (Baxter 1988: 156), as seen in (2-06), while overt realization of direct object kung is dispreferred with “human common nouns of indefinite reference (with or without an indefinite article), generic reference and non-human animate nouns of definite or indefinite reference” (Baxter 1988: 157). Baxter (1988: 156) also notes that with such nouns, “whether or not kung occurs [also] seems to depend on the speaker’s familiarity with, interest in, or disposition towards the predication”. Thus, in (2-07) kung would be more likely to appear “if the speaker felt some involvement or familiarity” with the child in question, but would be more likely to be absent “if the assertion wasn’t prominent, viewed without special interest” (Baxter 1988: 156-7).

However, it should be noted that this continuum of definiteness marking seems to have disappeared with fieldwork collaborators in Singapore in 2016, with most collaborators preferring the kung variant of (2-07) above and (2-10) below regardless of specificity or familiarity with the direct object:

(2-10) eli kurah ?kung/ø jenti

3SG cure ACC people

“He cures people.” (Baxter 1988: 159, incl. grammaticality judgement)

Finally, kung is occasionally allowed on some animals considered to be “‘higher’ animates” (Baxter 1988: 159), especially dogs or pets (160):
(2-11) yo sabeh kung akeh kachoru

1SG know ACC DET dog

“I know that dog.” (Baxter 1988: 160)

Table 1 summarises the rules governing the realization of *kung* as a direct object marker based on Baxter (1988) and fieldwork in 2016.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Noun type</th>
<th><em>Kung</em>-realization (Baxter, 1988)</th>
<th><em>Kung</em>-realization (Wong, 2016 fieldwork)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pronouns</td>
<td>Obligatory</td>
<td>Obligatory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proper names</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kin terms</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proper names of supernatural beings</td>
<td>Optional, preferred</td>
<td>Optional, preferred</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human common names of definite reference</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Higher’ non-human animate nouns (dogs or pets)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Optional, preferred</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human common nouns of indefinite reference regardless of presence of indefinite article</td>
<td></td>
<td>Optional, dispreferred</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human common nouns of generic reference</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-human animate nouns of definite or indefinite reference</td>
<td></td>
<td>Optional, dispreferred</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All other (inanimate) nouns</td>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>Absent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 1: Realization of kung as direct object marker*

*kung*-marked direct objects sometimes allow for an intervening adverb between the verb and *kung*, but non-*kung*-marked direct objects do not. This is especially salient with manner adverbs like *presta* ‘fast’.
Thus, in (2-12), *eli is kung*-marked and *presta* is able to intervene between the verb *papiah* and *kung*, but in (2-13) and (2-14), *kaza* and *buku* are not *kung*-marked and *presta* cannot intervene between the verb and the direct object. In (2-13) and (2-14) especially, a reading where *presta* modifies the noun instead of the verb is not possible; despite ongoing influence from English, these sentences appear to follow the pattern where adjectives are generally postnominal in Kristang (Baxter 1988: 104-5).

However, it must also be noted that a number of other instances of intervention between a verb and a *kung*-marked object were rejected as ungrammatical.
Here, collaborators expressed a preference for (2-16), where the adverb presta appears at the end of the verbal complex, over (2-15), where the adverb intervenes between the verb and kung, and the sentence becomes ungrammatical. Indeed, an explicit preference for adverbs to follow the verbal complex was generally observed, even when the variant of the sentence was grammatical with adverbial intervention between the verb and kung. (2-17) below, for example, was preferred over its counterpart (2-12) above.

2.3 INDIRECT OBJECT KUNG

kung also occasionally appears in ditransitive constructions, but on the indirect object (IO) rather than on the direct object (DO).
(2-18) yo ja dah mestri kung eli

1SG PST give teacher DAT 3SG

“I gave the teacher to him.”

In (2-18), for example, the direct object mestri is not preceded by kung, and kung instead appears on the indirect object eli. Crucially, this phenomenon appears to occur regardless of the animacy and/or definiteness of the two objects; in such DO IO constructions, kung always appears on the indirect object, even if the indirect object is inanimate and the direct object is animate.

(2-19) yo ja dah eli kung mar

1SG PST give 3SG DAT sea

“I gave him to the sea.”

In (2-19), the indirect object mar is preceded by kung, despite being inanimate, while eli, despite being animate, is not preceded by kung. This significantly contrasts with the earlier observed patterns of direct object kung-realization in transitive sentences, where the overt realization of kung was governed by animacy, and aligns with Baxter (1988: 161), who observes that in ditransitive constructions, “recipients are almost always marked with kung, regardless of nominal class. This is especially so where the recipient NP follows the object.”
When both objects are animate, however, Baxter (1988) claims that “in rare cases where both the recipient and the object are human…both [are] marked with kung [and] the order is object followed by recipient.” However, 2016 fieldwork data suggests that kung-marking realized on both the indirect object and the direct object is either dispreferred or ungrammatical, regardless of the order in which the indirect object and direct object are realized:

(2-20) */yo ja dah kung peskador kung Mathias

  1SG PST give ACC fisherman DAT Mathias

  */"I gave the fisherman to Mathias."  */kDO kIO

*"I gave Mathias to the fisherman."  *kIO kDO

(2-21) yo ja dah peskador kung Mathias

  1SG PST give fisherman DAT Mathias

  “I gave the fisherman to Mathias.”  *kDO kIO

*“I gave Mathias to the fisherman.”

In (2-20), the realization of kung before both the direct object peskador and the indirect object Mathias is dispreferred; the realization of kung in front of solely the latter appears to be the preferred construction. Taking peskador to be the indirect object and Mathias to be the direct object in (2-20) is also ungrammatical. kung, it seems, can only appear before the indirect object but not the direct object, as seen in (2-21). This phenomenon is even observed
with pronouns, which according to Baxter (1988: 151) occupy the highest position in the animacy hierarchy.

(2-22) ?yo ja dah kung olotu kung Joan
    1SG PST give ACC 3PL DAT Joan
    “I gave them to Joan.”           *kDO kIO
    “I gave Joan to them.”

(2-23)  yo ja dah olotu kung Joan
    1SG PST give 3PL DAT Joan
    “I gave them to Joan.”           DO kIO
    (**“I gave Joan to them.”)

Again, kung-marking on both the direct object olotu and the indirect object Joan seems to be dispreferred in (2-22), even though the former is a pronoun; only the latter can take kung, as seen in (2-23).

Alternative readings where the kung-marked DP is taken to be the direct object instead of the indirect object are also not grammatical.

(2-24)  *yo ja dah kung olotu Joan
    1SG PST give ACC 3PL Joan
    “I gave them to Joan.”           *kDO IO
In (2-24), for example, if olotu is taken to be the direct object and Joan the indirect object, with olotu preceded by kung, the sentence is ungrammatical. It also remains ungrammatical if the order of direct object olotu and indirect object Joan is reversed, as seen in (2-25).

Additionally, kung-IO realization appears to be preferred in DO IO constructions such as (2-23) above, but optional or ungrammatical in IO DO constructions, again regardless of the animacy or definiteness detailed in Section 2.2. An IO DO reading of (2-24), for example, as seen in (2-26) below, would be grammatical; however, collaborators expressed a preference for (2-27), where kung does not appear on either the direct object or the indirect object.

(2-25) yo ja dah Joan kung olotu
1SG PST give Joan ACC 3PL
“I gave them to Joan.”  *IO kDO

(2-26) yo ja dah kung olotu Joan
1SG PST give DAT 3PL Joan
“I gave Joan to them.”  kIO DO

(2-27) yo ja dah olotu Joan
1SG PST give 3PL Joan
“I gave Joan to them.”  DO IO
(*“I gave them to Joan.”)  *IO DO
In (2-27), the second reading where olotu is taken as the indirect object and Joan as the direct object is ungrammatical; the only order possible with neither object being kung-marked is the first reading, which follows a DO IO word order.

This pattern of kung-realization is maintained with DPs across the animacy continuum previously described for kung-marked transitive sentences in Section 2.1, even when the indirect object is lower on the animacy scale or inanimate.

**Inanimate DO non-human animate IO**

(2-28) \[ yō ja dah āgu *(kung) albi \]

1SG PST give water DAT tree

“I gave the tree water.” DO *(k)IO

(2-29) \[ yō ja dah *(kung) albi āgu \]

1SG PST give DAT tree water

“I gave the tree water.” (k)IO DO

**Inanimate DO inanimate IO**

(2-30) \[ yō ja dah āgu *(kung) pedra \]

1SG PST give water DAT stone

“I gave water to the stone.” DO kIO
In (2-28) and (2-30), where the indirect object follows the direct object (DO IO), the indirect object must be preceded by *kung*, even though the indirect object might be a non-human animate entity like *albi* in (2-28), or a completely inanimate entity like *pedra* in (2-30). In contrast, when the direct object follows the indirect object (IO DO), the direct object is optionally preceded by *kung*, again even when the indirect object is non-human animate (2-29) or inanimate (2-31).

Table 2 reviews what has been observed about ditransitive *kung*-marking thus far.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>kung-</strong></th>
<th><strong>Direct object-indirect object</strong></th>
<th><strong>Indirect object-direct object</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>appearance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On both direct and indirect object</td>
<td>?kDO kIO Dispreferred (2-20)</td>
<td>?kIO kDO Dispreferred (2-20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On indirect object only</td>
<td>DO kIO <strong>Grammatical</strong> (2-18), (2-19), (2-21), etc.</td>
<td>kIO DO <strong>Grammatical</strong> (2-26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On direct object only</td>
<td>*kDO IO Ungrammatical (2-24)</td>
<td>*IO kDO Ungrammatical (2-25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On neither</td>
<td>*DO IO Ungrammatical (2-27)</td>
<td>IO DO <strong>Grammatical</strong> (2-27)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 2: Ditransitive kung-marking in Kristang*

To summarize, in DO IO constructions, *kung* appears to be obligatory on the IO, whereas in IO DO constructions, *kung* is optional on the IO. In both DO IO and IO DO constructions, *kung* is not allowed on the DO. These conditions appear to hold regardless of animacy and definiteness, except for some IO DO constructions where *kung* was absent, and both objects were pronouns or one object was a human and the other a pronoun, which presented significant challenges for collaborators. For these IO DO constructions, collaborators often
provided conflicting grammaticality judgements or were otherwise unsure of the grammaticality of a sentence.

**Pronoun DO pronoun IO**

(2-32) yo ja dah olotu *(kung) eli

1SG PST give 3PL DAT 3SG

“I gave them to him.” DO *(k)IO

(2-33) yo ja dah *(kung) eli olotu

1SG PST give DAT 3SG 3PL

“I gave them to him.” *(k)IO DO

(2-32) is a DO kIO construction and follows the paradigm already set out in Table 2, where *kung* is only allowed on the indirect object *eli*, and an alternative reading where *eli* is the direct object and *kung* thus appears on the direct object is not allowed. However, in (2-33), which is an IO DO construction, the optionality of *kung* is unclear. This does not follow the paradigm already set out in Table 2, where the optionality of *kung* in an IO DO construction is otherwise clear.

**Pronoun DO proper name IO**

(2-34) yo ja dah olotu kung Mathias

1SG PST give 3PL DAT Mathias

“I gave them to Mathias.” DO kIO
(2-35)  *yo ja dah Mathias olotu

1SG PST give Mathias 3PL

“I gave Mathias to them.”  *IO DO

(2-36)  ?yo ja dah kung Mathias olotu

1SG PST give DAT Mathias 3PL

“I gave Mathias to them.”  ?kIO DO

Again, (2-34) is a DO kIO construction and follows the paradigm already set out in Table 2, where *kung is only allowed on the indirect object Mathias. However, in (2-35), an IO DO construction without kung on the indirect object Mathias is ungrammatical, which contrasts with the paradigm set out in Table 2 where kung is optional on the indirect object in an IO DO construction. Moreover, when kung does precede the indirect object Mathias in an IO DO construction in (2-36), collaborators remain unclear as to whether the sentence is grammatical or not.

IO DO constructions where one object was a pronoun and the other a non-human animate or inanimate, by contrast, generally followed the patterns of realization detailed in Table 2 with minimal contestation, where *kung could optionally appear before the IO.
Pronoun DO non-human animate IO

(2-37) yo ja dah (kung) kachoru eli

1SG PST give DAT dog 3SG

“I gave him to the dog.” (k)IO DO

Pronoun DO inanimate IO

(2-38) yo ja dah (kung) pedra olotu

1SG PST give DAT stone 3PL

“I gave them to the stone.” (k)IO DO

Both (2-37) and (2-38), which also feature a DO pronoun following the indirect object, correspond to the kung-realization paradigms observed in Table 2: in (2-37), kung can optionally appear before the lesser-animate indirect object kachoru, while in (2-38), kung optionally appear before the inanimate indirect object pedra. Contrasting these with (2-32) and (2-36), therefore, where kung could not appear before an indirect object of higher animacy status, this would appear to suggest that when a pronoun appears as the direct object, some vestige of the animacy hierarchy that holds for kung-marked transitive sentences may continue to hold for this restricted set of ditransitives with pronouns as direct objects.

As observed above for transitive sentences, in kung-marked ditransitives, the placement of manner adverbs such as presta ‘fast’ between the verb and a kung-marked object is again sometimes acceptable.
The adverb *presta* can appear between the verb and *kung* adjacent to *kung* and after the direct object. Such intervention also appears to be grammatical, for example, when it occurs with the benefactive marker *padi*.

(2-40) yo fazeh kaza presta padi bos

1SG make house fast   BEN 2SG

“I build a house for you.”

Again, in (2-40), *presta* can appear between the verb and *padi* adjacent to *padi*. The sentence becomes ungrammatical, however, when the adverb appears before the direct object.

(2-41) *yo ja dah presta binti pataka kung eli*

1SG PST give fast twenty dollar  DAT 3SG

“I gave twenty dollars to him quickly.”
Here, *presta* appears between the verb *dah* and the direct object *binti pataka* without being adjacent to *kung*, suggesting that *presta* must appear adjacent to *kung* in ditransitive sentences if it is to be allowed to intervene between the verb and *kung*.

2.4 SUMMARY AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS

From the data above, we observe that in transitive sentences, *kung* marks the direct object based on an animacy scale; however, in ditransitive sentences, direct object marking by *kung* is impossible, and *kung* instead marks the indirect object regardless of the animacy scale that governs its appearance in transitive sentences. These phenomena either contradict or otherwise complicate what was observed about *kung* marking by Baxter (1988).

Building on both Baxter (1988) and my own fieldwork, I thus again note that the research questions this paper hopes to address are the following:

- Research Question 1: Why does *kung* mark the direct object in transitive sentences but the indirect object in ditransitive sentences?
- Research Question 2: Why is indirect object *kung* marking obligatory in DO IO ditransitive constructions but optional in IO DO ditransitive constructions?
- Research Question 3: Why does direct object *kung* operate on an animacy scale where indirect object *kung* does not?
- Research Question 4: Can these phenomena be accounted for using formal syntactic analysis?
Chapter 3 now introduces Richards (2010)’s theory of Distinctness, which appears to be well-suited to addressing these questions and allowing us to understand *kung*-realization in Kristang.
3.1 BACKGROUND TO DISTINCTNESS AND RELEVANCE TO KUNG

Distinctness as a theory was developed by Richards (2006) and Richards (2010) in order to account for “a number of phenomena in different languages [that are] constrained by a ban on multiple objects of the same type that are too close together” (Richards 2010: 3). An example of such phenomena, as documented in Richards (2006), is the following adjacency constraint on quotative inversion in English, shown below in the contrast between (3-01) and (3-02).

(3-01) "It’s raining," said the weatherman to the weatherwoman.

(3-02) *"It’s raining," told the weatherman the weatherwoman.

(Richards 2006: 9)

Both sentences contain the two DPs [DP the weatherman] and [DP the weatherwoman]. However, (3-02) is ungrammatical when the two DPs are adjacent to each other, where in (3-01) the sentence is grammatical when they are separated by to, suggesting that some sort of adjacency constraint where the two DPs are “too close together” is operating on both (3-01) and (3-02), and causing the latter to crash.

Richards (2010) thus sought to “formalize [these] notions like ‘close together’” (4) and in doing so “capture a number of recalcitrant syntactic phenomena that seem to conform to a
general pattern of avoidance of adjacent identical objects” (Richards 2006: 2). He also sought to account for instances where two identical objects indeed appear to be adjacent to each other, apparently counterexemplifying the aforementioned ‘general pattern of avoidance’. In (3-03), for example, \[DP \text{John}\] and \[DP \text{a book}\] are apparently in such a ‘too close’ relation; nonetheless, the sentence remains grammatical, a striking contrast to (3-04), where when the order of DPs is reversed, the derivation crashes without the inclusion of to.

(3-03) I gave John a book.

(Richards 2010: 4)


Distinctness seems to be an eminently suitable theory to explain the patterns of \textit{kung}-realization observed in Chapter 2, which pattern along the lines of (3-03) and (3-04) and also appear to depend on some sort of “too close” and “too similar” constraint. Consider again, for instance, (3-05) with its DO IO word order, and (3-06), with IO DO, which highlight this constraint:

(3-05) \textit{yo ja dah pastu *(kung) Martha}

\textit{1SG PST give bird DAT Martha}

“I gave Martha a bird.”
In (3-05), the absence of *kung* makes the utterance ungrammatical, suggesting the two DPs [DP pastu] and [DP Martha] cannot be ‘too close together’. However, in (3-06), when the DPs are reversed, no such adjacency constraint appears, and the result is grammatical. Distinctness, as will be demonstrated in Chapter 4, provides a strong explanation for this phenomenon. The further appeal of Distinctness is due to its ability to simultaneously explain the difference between ditransitive and transitive marking in Kristang, and why the former does not pattern according to the animacy scale that otherwise governs the latter.

### 3.2 INTRODUCTION TO DISTINCTNESS

Distinctness “bans Spell-Out domains containing more than one node of the same kind in an asymmetric c-command relation” (Richards 2010: 141). Such a relation is undesirable because it will “force the creation of linearization statements of the form &lt;α, α&gt;, which are uninterpretable and cause the linearization process to crash” (Richards 2010: 141). This condition is summarized in (3-07) below:

(3-07) **Distinctness**

If a linearization statement &lt;α, α&gt; is generated, the derivation crashes.

(Richards 2010: 5)
Taking the above example of (3-02), for instance, the problem of the DPs $\text{[DP the weatherman]}$ and $\text{[DP the weatherwoman]}$ being “too close together” can now be explained as occurring due to the generation of a linearization statement $<\text{DP, DP}>$ within the same domain, which is uninterpretable and therefore results in an ungrammatical derivation.

To explain so-called “low applicative” (Pylkkänen 2002: 19, Richards 2010: 90) sentences like (3-03), where two apparent DP nodes appear adjacent to each other but the sentence is grammatical, Richards (2010: 91) notes that the two objects are likely to be structurally farther apart from each other, as evidenced by the examples below from an unidentified dialect of English from Emonds (1976) and Koizumi (1993):

(3-08) *The secretary sent out [the stockholders] [a schedule].
(3-09) The secretary sent [the stockholders] out [a schedule].
(3-10) I sent out [a schedule] [to the stockholders].
(3-11) I sent [a schedule] out [to the stockholders].

In the low applicative sentence (3-08), the two objects cannot be adjacent to each other; they must be separated by the postverbal particle *out* as in (3-09). In contrast, in (3-10) and (3-11), we see that $\text{[DP a schedule]}$ can remain adjacent to $\text{[PP to the stockholders]}$ without causing ungrammaticality. Richards (2010: 91) thus takes this as strong evidence for the direct object in (3-09) (and, by extension of hypothesis, (3-03)) being much higher in the structure compared to the indirect object in low applicative structures; he argues that the direct object must necessarily move to a higher position in such constructions, and in doing
so likely crosses a Spell-Out boundary, ensuring that it and the indirect object are linearized in separate domains. To this end, therefore, Richards postulates that the indirect object is embedded in a K(ase)P, which is a phase head that therefore “insulates” the indirect object from other DPs and ensures that it is linearized separately (Richards 2010: 32). As the landing site of this indirect object-embedded KP, Richards (2010: 14) suggests that “the base position of the subject is not...the highest position in the vP phase” and postulates the existence of an additional layer of structure directly above vP, which he calls vcP, and its accompanying projection vc. The KP then moves to the specifier of vc, and a grammatical result is obtained. The tree for (3-03) thus might look something like (3-12) below, where bold lines indicate Spell-Out boundaries:
Assuming the “semantic properties of the [indirect] object allow it to enter the derivation as a KP” (Richards 2010: 87), the system builds, checks and spells out the direct object a book and the indirect object John in separate phases, with the latter “insulated” from the former within the KP, before linearizing the subject I in a final third phase. With the introduction of the KP additional layer of structure, the computational system builds, checks and spells out each individual DP within a Spell-Out domain before the succeeding DP is similarly derived. This thereby ensures that [DP a book], [DP John] and [DP I] are linearized in separate phases, and results in a grammatical sentence without causing a Distinctness violation, since “a strong phase boundary intervened between...two potentially offending objects”, and Distinctness only bans linearization of more than one object of the same type within the same phasal domain (Richards 2010: 32).

3.3 DISTINCTNESS AND DIFFERENTIAL OBJECT MARKING

Distinctness further appears especially suited to explaining the patterns of kung-realization described in Chapter 2 because Richards (2010: 25-32) is able to use it to describe similar differential object marking phenomena in a number of other languages, including Chaha, Spanish, Hindi and Miskitu, with notably Spanish a closely-related language to Kristang’s superstrate Portuguese. Each of these languages also possesses a morpheme or particle that appears on “specific animate direct objects and all indirect objects” (Richards 2010: 29), and which cannot appear on both indirect and direct objects simultaneously: in Chaha, the prefix ya-, in Hindi, the suffix –ko, in Spanish, the particle a, and in Miskitu the suffix –ra. (3-13) to (3-16) provide an example of Spanish a marking for animacy and specificity in a transitive paradigm as described in Montrul & Bowles (2009: 365).
In (3-13) and (3-15), the direct objects are the indefinite inanimate *una casa* in (3-13) and the indefinite human animate *una mujer* in (3-15); hence, neither sentence receives a marking. (3-14), which has a definite direct object *la casa* also does not receive a marking as the house is inanimate; only in (3-16), where the direct object *la mujer* is a specific human animate object, is a realized preceding it. Thus, we see that *a* in Spanish clearly marks for both specificity and animacy.
However, I here again note that as observed in Chapter 2, based on fieldwork in 2016, the similar marker *kung* in Kristang appears to no longer mark for specificity; only animacy distinctions appear to be salient for *kung*-realization. Therefore, this section focusses solely on *a*-marking in Spanish with regards to animacy, and how it might inform a similar analysis of *kung*-marking in Kristang.

As Richards (2010) observes, an interesting puzzle appears with such *a*-marking: one might hypothesize that *a* appears in order to distinguish the animate subject and the animate object, both of which might otherwise contribute to a Distinctness violation. However, by extension, *a* should then not appear in cases where the subject is inanimate and the object is animate, since “the animate object will...be distinguishable from it, and differential case marking will...become unnecessary” (Richards 2010: 79). One might then further hypothesize that *a* should appear when both DPs are inanimate, since by extension of the argument above they are again indistinguishable. Both these facts are patently not the case, as evidenced in this data from Torrego (1998: 30) cited in Richards (2010: 79).

\[
(3-17) \quad \text{el vino emborrach-ó} \quad *(a) \quad \text{varios invitados}
\]

3SG wine make.drunk-3SG.PST.PRET ACC some guests

“The wine made several guests drunk.”
In (3-17), \textit{el vino} is an inanimate subject, but the absence of \textit{a} preceding the animate object still renders the sentence ungrammatical, suggesting that \textit{a} is still required to distinguish the subject and object in some way. Meanwhile, in (3-18), both the subject \textit{el coche} and the object \textit{una lata} are inanimate, but \textit{a} is not allowed to appear. Together, these suggest that “\textit{a} does not appear simply when the subject and object have identical values for animacy” (Richards 2010: 81).

To understand this paradigm, Richards (2010) proposes an account based on work by Harbour (2007), later elaborated upon in Harbour, Adger & Bejar (2010), where DPs are assumed to be “underspecified for \(\phi\)-features” (Richards 2010: 81). Taking the Kristang example (3-19) below, for instance, we might say that the human animate \textit{yo} is specified for \ [+author, +participant] as a first-person pronoun (Richards 2010: 81), but the inanimate \textit{pedra} is completely unspecified for the same \([\pm author, \pm participant]\) features.

(3-18) \textit{el coche aplastó }\textit{(*a) una lata}

\[3SG\text{ car crush-3SG.PST.PRET ACC DET.INDEF(3) can}\]

“The car crushed a can.”

(3-19) \textit{yo olah pedra}

\[1SG\text{ see rock}\]

“I see a rock.”
Accounting for the Spanish paradigm above, as Richards (2010) notes, Adger & Harbour (2007: 25-7, 30-1) (themselves building on work by Ormazabal & Romero (2002) later elaborated on in Ormazabal & Romero (2007)) claim that “agreements merged in the specifier of vP must in fact be specified for the features [±author, ±participant]” (Richards 2010: 81). Hence, in the Kristang example (3-20) below, the inanimate subject *pedra*, being merged in the specifier of vP, would gain the specification [-author, -participant], “even though an inanimate object can be underspecified for those features” (Richards 2010: 81).

(3-20) pedra dali kareta
rock  hit  car
“The rock hit the car.”

Adger & Harbour (2007: 31) further extend this argument and observe that [+participant] DPs are always [+animate], but not the other way round; building on this asymmetry, Richards (2010: 82) claims that these can be represented in syntactic hierarchies like the ones demonstrated below in (3-21) for the Kristang nominals *yo ‘1sg’, eli ’3sg’* and *pedra* ‘rock’, where the [±animate] feature dominates [±author] and [±participant] and serves as the head φ of the projection φP.
Here, following Richards (2010)’s analysis, yo ‘1sg’ has positive specifications for [+author], [+participant] and [+animate]; it therefore projects a ϕP. Similarly, eli ‘3sg’ lacks specifications for [±author] and [±participant], but is still specified for [+animate], and so also projects a ϕP. In contrast, pedra ‘rock’ lacks specifications for [±author], [±participant] and [±animate], and instead “is dominated by some other set of functional heads” such as a DP (Richards 2010: 82). When they appear in the specifier of vP, therefore, which requires nominals to be specified for [±author] and [±participant], and hence by extension [±animate], eli and pedra become ϕPs with specification for their previously underspecified features, resulting in the trees below in (3-22).

(3-22)
This technology now allows us to capture the distinction between inanimate DP subjects that appear in the specifier of vP, obligatorily gain [±animate] specification and therefore project a ϕP, and inanimate DP objects that require no such specification and remain DPs. Returning to the Spanish data above, we can now clearly observe how Distinctness is preserved, summarized in Table 3 from Richards (2010).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject (always specified for [±animate])</th>
<th>Object</th>
<th>Does a appear?</th>
<th>Examples (all Definite)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ϕP (+animate)</td>
<td>ϕP (+animate)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>(3-16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ϕP (+animate)</td>
<td>DP</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>(3-14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ϕP (-animate)</td>
<td>ϕP (+animate)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>(3-17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ϕP (-animate)</td>
<td>DP</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>(3-18)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 3: Distinctness and appearance of a in Spanish*

Thus, when both the subject and object are ϕPs, a must appear, providing a KP-type layer of structure to ensure that Distinctness is not violated and both ϕPs can be linearized in separate domains (Richards 2010: 82, 116). By contrast, when the subject is a ϕP but the object is a DP, the two are distinct and no appearance of a is required. Hence, this a-realization paradigm in Spanish, built on animacy specification distinctions, appears to correspond strongly to the similar pattern of direct object kung-marking observed by Baxter (1988) and during fieldwork in 2016 described earlier with particular regards to animacy (although again, not with regard to specificity, which was not a salient feature of the 2016 fieldwork data).
Also congruent is the pattern of ditransitive a marking in Spanish, where ditransitive indirect objects are marked with a, but direct object marking with a is “systematically avoided” (Malchukov 2008: 218). As with the example of kung in ditransitive marking in Kristang, if both objects are marked with a, the sentence becomes ungrammatical (Richards 2010: 30) or of uncertain grammaticality (Malchukov 2008: 213). The examples (3-23) and (3-24), from Torrego (1998: 133-4) and cited in Richards (2010: 30), illustrate this:

(3-23) describi-eron un maestro de Zen a-l papa
      describe-3PL.PST INDF.DET master   GEN Zen DAT-DEF.DET pope
      “They described a Zen master to the Pope.”

(3-24) *describi-eron a un maestro de Zen a-l papa
      describe-3PL.PST ACC INDF.DET master   GEN Zen DAT-DEF.DET pope
      “They described a Zen master to the Pope.”

Thus, in the grammatical (3-23), only the indirect object [DP el papa] (the article el having been agglutinated with a (Batchelor & Ángel San José 2010: 53)) is marked with the marker a, whereas in the ungrammatical (3-24), both the indirect object [DP el papa] and the direct object [DP un maestro] are a-marked, resulting in ungrammaticality.

Richards (2010)’s Distinctness-based analysis of these various differential object markers thus appears to provide a strong basis for investigation of similar phenomena related to kung.
in Kristang. Chapter 4 now provides an analysis of ditransitive marking in Kristang using this theory of Distinctness.
CHAPTER 4

DISTINCTNESS AND KUNG IN KRISTANG

This chapter attempts to account for the distribution of kung in Kristang transitive and ditransitive sentences with recourse to Richards (2010)’s theory of Distinctness. Following Richards (2010: 4), I assume that linearization takes place under the conditions enforced by a version of Kayne (1994)’s Linear Correspondence Axiom (LCA). Under the LCA, for a linearization statement <α, β> where α and β are in asymmetric c-command, Spell-Out generates linearization instructions where “the image of α (that is, the terminals dominated by α) is ordered with respect to the image of β” (Richards 2010: 4). A Distinctness violation, as described in Chapter 3, therefore occurs when a linearization statement such as <α, α> occurs, and the system is unable to distinguish between the two and determine which should precede the other, causing the derivation to crash (Richards 2010: 4-5).

I therefore also assume that Chomsky (2001: 14)’s Phase Impenetrability Condition (PIC) holds, as described in (4-01) below:

(4-01)  

*Phase Impenetrability Condition* (PIC)  

for a Phase HP with head H, the domain of H is not accessible to operations outside HP; only H and its edge are accessible to such operations, the edge being the residue outside of H’, either specifiers (Specs) or elements adjoined to HP (Chomsky 2001: 14).
Thus, once H has been linearized and spelled out within the phase demarcated by HP, constituents within H are “not accessible to [further] operations”. However, the edge of HP, which usually includes the specifier of H’ and other “elements adjoined to HP”, remains available for further operations (Chomsky 2001: 14).

Finally, based on the data in Chapter 2, I assume only one occurrence of kung is permitted in a sentence in contemporary Kristang in Singapore. As noted in Chapter 2, although the marking of more than one object with kung was permitted in examples in Baxter (1988), collaborators in Singapore generally found such sentences ungrammatical, as seen in (2-20), repeated here as (4-02).

(4-02)  */yo ja dah kung peskador kung Mathias
            1SG PST give ACC fisherman DAT Mathias
            */“I gave the fisherman to Mathias.”  */kDO kIO
            *“I gave Mathias to the fisherman.”  *kIO kDO

A similar constraint can be observed in another unrelated language, Japanese, where the Double-o Constraint “prohibits multiple occurrences of the accusative Case particle o under certain conditions” (Hiraiwa 2010: 724), which Hiraiwa (2010: 746-62) is also able to analyse with reference to cyclic phase-by-phase derivation.

To explain the patterns of transitive and ditransitive kung-realization observed in Chapter 2, I propose that in Kristang, a vCprobe triggers object shift out of its original in-situ position; a
similar piece of architecture has been proposed, for example, with the unrelated language Dinka (van Urk & Richards 2015: 122). In transitive sentences, this results in the subject and the direct object appearing in the same domain for Spell-Out and linearization; based on the \( \phi \)-specifications of the two DPs and similar to what has been described in Section 3.3, if the two objects are too similar, this then necessitates the realization of *kung*, the omission of which might otherwise cause a Distinctness violation. In low applicative ditransitive sentences, where the indirect object follows the direct object, \( \nu_C \) again attempts to probe for a DP for object shift; however, it encounters the KP/PP containing the indirect object headed by *kung* and stops, following Chomsky (2000: 123)'s theory of defective intervention. Finally, in prepositional dative ditransitives, where the indirect object precedes the direct object, the \( \nu_C \) probe again does not trigger further object shift due to the one *kung*-constraint: further object shift would place the direct object and the subject in the same domain, which would risk a Distinctness violation if the direct object is found to match the subject in terms of feature specification.

In all three cases, the *kung*-marked object is embedded in a KP or a PP and “insulated” from the other DPs; following Richards (2010) and Abels (2003), I assume that KPs and PPs are also phases, and that such embedding allows the *kung*-marked object to be Spelled Out and linearized in its domain without causing a Distinctness violation. However, as observed above, each type of *kung*-marked sentence is otherwise formed differently, and requires separate analysis, which will be described below beginning with transitive sentences.
4.1 DISTINCTNESS AND TRANSITIVE KUNG-MARKING IN KRISTANG

As previously observed, kung in transitive sentences appears to follow an animacy hierarchy in terms of realization patterns: human animate direct objects obligatorily require kung, as seen in (4-03), lesser animate direct objects such as dogs can optionally take kung, as seen in (4-04), and realization of kung with inanimate objects is not possible, as seen in (4-05).

(4-03)  yo dali *(kung) bos
        1SG hit   ACC   2SG
        “I hit you.”

(4-04)  yo dali ?(kung) kachoru
        1SG hit   ACC   dog
        “I hit the dog.”

(4-05)  yo dali (*kung) pedra
        1SG hit   ACC   rock
        “I hit the rock.”

As was noted in the previous chapter, these distinctions are readily comparable to the a-realization paradigm already observed with Spanish, as well as with Chaha, Hindi and Miskitu as described by Richards (2010: 132); (4-06) and (4-07) provide even stronger evidence for such a comparison by showing that like in the case of a, kung-realization in transitive sentences is not affected by the animacy of the subject, only by that of the object.
If *kung*-realization was indeed predicated on a straightforward [+animate]/[–animate] distinction between subject and object, then in (4-06), we would expect *kung* not to be required to appear, since the subject *pedra* is inanimate but the object *bos* is animate. However, this is not the case; *kung* obligatorily appears preceding *bos*. Similarly, in (4-07), we would expect *kung* to appear to distinguish the subject *pedra* and the object *kareta*, since both are inanimate; nonetheless, the appearance of *kung* seems to be dispreferred.

From these, therefore, it appears that Richards (2010)'s feature-premised Distinctness analysis of transitive *a*-realization specification in Spanish outlined in Chapter 3 can similarly be applied to transitive *kung*-realization analysis in Kristang. As was the case with Spanish, in Kristang, DPs appearing in the specifier of *vP* regardless of prior animacy specification must obligatorily gain formal animacy specification, projecting a ϕP if they do not already do so. Due to object shift caused by *νC*, both the direct object and the subject move to the same (higher) phase; hence, the system must provide *kung*-support if both the subject
and the object are now $\phi$Ps. It instead withholds or is strongly disinclined to provide that support if the subject is a $\phi$P and the object is a DP, and can already be distinguished. To illustrate this, a tree for (4-03) is provided below as (4-08), where bold lines indicate Spell-Out boundaries.

(4-08)

In (4-08), the subject $[\phi_P \text{yo}]$ appears in the specifier of $v_P$, and already is specified for $[+\text{human animate}]$. Meanwhile, $v_C$ probes the structure for an object and finds the direct object $[\phi_P \text{bos}]$; $[\phi_P \text{bos}]$ moves to the specifier of $v_C$, while the subject $[\phi_P \text{yo}]$, on the edge of the phase headed by $v_C$, moves to the specifier of $T'$ (or another position above $v_C$ but within the higher phase). Since both $[\phi_P \text{yo}]$ and $[\phi_P \text{bos}]$ are both $\phi$Ps and are now in the same phase, the system then provides $kung$-support by embedding $[\phi_P \text{bos}]$ in a KP/PP headed by $kung$ in
order to ensure that the linearization statement $<\phi P, \phi P>$ is not produced and a Distinctness violation does not occur.

In addition to *kung* no longer marking for specificity, a further difference between Spanish and Kristang (based on 2016 fieldwork and with sole reference to the Spanish data mentioned in Richards (2010), Torrego (1998), Malchukov (2008) and others already previously cited in this paper) is that Kristang currently specifies for $vP$ [±human animate] rather than simply [±animate]. I summarize these formal specification paradigms and their effect on *kung*-realization in Kristang in Table 4 below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject (always specified for [±human animate])</th>
<th>Object</th>
<th>Does <em>kung</em> appear?</th>
<th>Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\phi P$ (±human animate)</td>
<td>$\phi P$ (±human animate)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>(4-03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\phi P$ (±human animate)</td>
<td>DP</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>(4-05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\phi P$ (–human animate)</td>
<td>$\phi P$ (±human animate)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>(4-06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\phi P$ (–human animate)</td>
<td>DP</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>(4-07)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 4: Distinctness and appearance of *kung* in Kristang*

As with the case of Spanish, therefore, Kristang only requires *kung*-support if both the subject and the direct object are $\phi Ps$, as in (4-03) and (4-06), and must be linearized in separate domains via embedding of the direct object in a KP/PP. In contrast, if the subject is a $\phi P$ but the object is an underspecified DP, as in (4-05) and (4-07), then the two are sufficiently Distinct to be linearized within the same domain, and do not require *kung*-
support. This thus explains why *kung* is obligatorily realized with human animate direct objects in the transitive data presented in Chapter 2, and is strongly dispreferred in the case of other types of direct objects. In the case of examples like (4-04), where some speakers permit the realization of *kung* with higher animates such as *kachoru* 'dogs', it might be said that these speakers specify [+higher animate] instead of [+human animate], the exact gradations and boundaries of which seem to vary by speaker.

I turn now to a Distinctness-based analysis of ditransitive *kung*-marking in Kristang, and show that Distinctness can also account for such phenomena, as well as why *kung*-marking conditions differ in transitives and ditransitives. As above in the introduction to this chapter, I here provide separate explanations for low applicative ditransitive constructions and prepositional dative ditransitive constructions, beginning with the former.

### 4.2 DISTINCTNESS AND DITRANSITIVE KUNG-MARKING IN KRISTANG

Recall that *kung* optionally appears in low applicative IO DO constructions on the indirect object, and obligatorily appears in DO IO constructions on the indirect object; (2-20) and (2-23), repeated here as (4-09) and (4-10) respectively, re-exemplify this contrast, last observed in Chapter 2. I follow Richards (2010: 90) in terming DO IO constructions like (4-10) “prepositional datives”.

(4-09) \(\text{yo ja dah} \ (kung) \text{ Joan olotu}\)

\[1\text{SG PST give DAT Joan olotu}\]

“I gave them to Joan.”  \((k)\text{IO DO}\)
(4-10) \[ \text{yo ja dah olotu *(kung) Joan} \]
\[ 1SG\ PST\ give\ them\ DAT\ Joan \]

“I gave them to Joan.”

DO *(k)IO

(4-11) below exemplifies the tree structure for the low applicative construction (4-09); bold lines again demarcate Spell-Out boundaries.

(4-11)

In the low applicative construction in (4-11), the direct object [DP olotu] is realized as the complement of [v dah], and the indirect object [PP (kung) Joan] is realized as its specifier, c-commanding the direct object. \(v_c\) then probjoanes its complement for an object to undergo
object shift; however, [PP (kung) Joan] intervenes between the probe and the object [DP olotu]. I propose that in such instances, such PPs in Kristang create a blocking effect under what Chomsky (2000) terms defective intervention, preventing the direct object from moving over the PP-embedded indirect object and thus from raising to a higher position (Chomsky 2000: 123). Indeed, such PP-blocking effects are relatively common in Indo-European languages, from which Kristang likely derives some influence: Hartman (2011: 122) notes that they have been observed in French (McGinnis 1998), Icelandic (Holmberg & Hróarsdóttir 2004), Modern Greek (Anagnostopoulou 2003) and, again, most notably Spanish (Torrego 1996), a closely-related language to Kristang’s superstrate Portuguese. Because of defective intervention, therefore, the direct object [DP olotu] cannot move over the PP-embedded indirect object [PP (kung) Joan] and remains in-situ. However, the indirect object, embedded in a PP phase headed by an optionally pronounced kung, is still linearized separately within its own domain from the direct object, which is linearized in the vP phase, preserving Distinctness; the subject [DP yo], at the edge of the vP phase, moves to a higher position in the tree and is linearized in a higher domain. Together, these ensure that none of the three DPs are too close together, and results in a grammatical structure.

Next, the tree structure of the prepositional dative construction (4-10) is provided below as (4-12). Again, Spell-Out boundaries are marked with bold lines.
Recall that I took the low applicative construction to be the default ditransitive word order. For the prepositional dative construction in (4-12), I then posit that object shift initiated by the \( v_c \) probe is prohibited; although the \( v_c \) probe does not face defective intervention by a PP as it does in the low applicative construction, raising the direct object would move it into the same domain as the subject, which, as in the previous constructions, is in the edge of the \( v_P \) phase, is obligatorily specified for \( [\pm \text{human animate}] \) and escapes to the higher domain for linearization. If, as in (4-12), both the direct object [\( \text{DP olotu} \)] and the subject [\( \text{DP yo} \)] in question are \( \phi \)Ps, moving them into the same domain would cause a Distinctness violation: the system would be unable to rescue the sentence through \( \text{kung} \) PP-embedding due to the one-\( \text{kung} \) constraint, with the indirect object [\( \text{PP kung Joan} \)] already being \( \text{kung} \)-marked.
Hence, in prepositional dative constructions such as (4-12), the direct object remains in the specifier, while the subject still raises into the higher domain.

4.3 LIMITATIONS ON DISTINCTNESS

Distinctness thus seems to provide an adequate explanation for the patterns of kung-realization observed in Chapter 2. However, this proposal does also appear to be limited, in that it cannot presently provide a strong account for the adverb data observed in Chapter 2.

In the English example in Section 3.2, we saw that with low applicatives, there is evidence that movement of the direct object appears to be obligatory in some dialects of English; additional evidence from Soh (1998)'s Mandarin Chinese data cited by Richards (2010: 90-1) appears to show that the same is true in Mandarin Chinese.

(4-13) wo song-le nei-ge pengyou liang ci xiaoshuo
1SG give-COMPL DET-CLASS friend two time novel
“I gave that friend a novel twice.”

(4-14) wo song-guo liang ci xiaoshuo gei Zhangsan
1SG give-COMPL two time novel give Zangsan
“I gave a novel to Zangsan twice.”

In the low applicative construction (4-13), as Richards (2010: 91) observes, the adverb liang ci intervenes between the indirect object nei-ge pengyou and the direct object xiaoshuo,
whereas in the low applicative construction, it appears before both. Richards (2010) takes this as strong evidence that again, in the low applicative, the indirect object is higher in the structure compared to the direct object, where in the prepositional dative both objects can be low in the tree.

Following this, low applicatives in Kristang such as (4-11) should hypothetically demonstrate the same pattern of adverbial intervention, where an adverb (or some other object) can intervene between the indirect object and the direct object. However, no adverb has yet been observed to be able to intervene in such fashion. (4-15), for example, is strongly ungrammatical, where the adverb *presta* cannot intervene between the objects *Martha* and *pastu* (nor can it modify *pastu* as an adjective).

(4-15)  *yo ja  dah Martha presta pastu  
       1SG PST give Martha fast  bird

"I quickly gave Martha a bird."

Low applicatives in Kristang do demonstrate argument asymmetries in terms of quantifier-pronoun binding, such as in (4-16) and (4-17) below, suggesting that the structure postulated in (4-12) is at least partially correct in terms of the positions of objects relative to each other.
Unfortunately, this alone does not indicate the relative height of the indirect object in comparison to the direct object, and it remains to be seen if an adverb or any other object is allowed to intervene between objects in such low applicatives.

Additionally, as observed in Chapter 2, in prepositional datives, adverb intervention is possible between the two objects, as in (2-39) below, repeated as (4-18).

(4-18) yo  dah  binti  pataka  presta  kung  eli

1SG  give  twenty  dollar  fast  DAT  3SG

“I give twenty dollars to him quickly.”

(Also possible but strange: “I give him twenty fast dollars.”)

However, this raises the questions of where exactly the adverb presta appears in the structure, given that under the proposal above, the objects [DP binti pataka] and [PP kung eli]
should appear close together, and, leading on from there, whether the direct object \([DP \text{ binti pataka}]\) does indeed raise to a higher position in the structure.

A final unanswered question unrelated to the adverb data is why the realization of *kung* might be optional in the low applicative but compulsory in the prepositional dative. These questions are beyond the scope of this paper, but they do provide strong limitations prohibiting an otherwise more firm adoption of Distinctness theory for *kung*-marking in Kristang.

### 4.4 SUMMARY

In sum, Distinctness does provide a relatively strong explanation for *kung*-behavior in Kristang, and has allowed us to understand why animacy restrictions appear to play a strong role in transitive sentences but not in ditransitives, and why *kung* does not appear on direct objects in both transitives and ditransitives: rather than being motivated by animacy, *kung*-realization appears to be governed by Distinctness, and the computational system's attempts to avoid linearization contradictions. What appear to be separate, unrelated phenomena related to *kung*, therefore, can be united under Distinctness theory in an empirically elegant and efficient way. However, I do note that adverb evidence complicates the theory and limits its applicability to Kristang; in addition, the optionality of *kung* on low applicatives was also not explained under Distinctness. I now go on to further note two other, more practical limitations.
This paper considered structural motivations for a series of syntactic phenomena related to differential object marking involving the particle *kung* in Kristang, a critically endangered and severely underdocumented language spoken mainly in Singapore and Malacca. It did so based on original fieldwork data collected among speakers in Singapore; I here briefly outline two methodological and ethical issues I had in compiling and analysing this data, and consider their implications for future linguistic theory based on language documentation.

5.1 VARIATION

As mentioned in Chapter 1, contemporary Kristang speakers demonstrate significant phonological, syntactic and orthographic variation for a number of sociolinguistic reasons. Although the *kung*-feature selected for analysis in this paper was relatively stable across Peskisa collaborators, with collaborators usually agreeing on grammaticality judgements, it must be noted that these speakers probably do not represent the full breadth of Kristang variation as the language is presently spoken in Singapore, Malacca and in smaller communities elsewhere. Indeed, some variation with *kung* was even significant enough for the researcher to elicit similar structures on multiple occasions, such as the construction in (5-01) and (5-02) below:
In an early session of elicitation, BF and CA judged (5-01) to be grammatical, and rejected any omission of *kung*; DC, however, insisted that it was (5-02) that was grammatical, and that *kung* could not appear before *eli*. DC did subsequently reverse his judgement in a separate session, but such dissonant judgements between collaborators remain frequent, and it is difficult to say with confidence that a particular structure represents the structure of all Kristang speakers.

Additionally, as already seen with DC, speakers were not always consistent in their grammaticality judgements, often returning multiple times during an elicitation session to review and reevaluate a prior judgement, or revising a previous judgement for the same item on a second, separate occasion. A further example of this is given below in (5-03) and (5-04), which were elicited with BF.
BF initially judged (5-03) to be a grammatical sentence, then some time later reviewed this judgement and reevaluated it as incorrect. In a separate session with (5-04), BF first observed that this sentence was grammatical, then almost immediately said “sounds a bit funny”, and then changed their judgement to ungrammatical.

Although, as previously noted in Chapter 1, I contend that linguistic theory should work towards being able to incorporate such variation and grammaticality re-evaluations in analysis, it also presently remains objectively difficult to treat such data as fully reliable, since collaborator grammaticality judgements might hypothetically change at any time, and collaborators frequently contradict each other about a significant number of elements in the language. Of course, as Hudson (2007: 10) notes, “the truth about language is much more complicated than mainstream linguistic theory suggests”, and it remains to be seen how said linguistic theory might continue to evolve in its recognition and ability to deal with such data — particularly if, as suggested by Grenoble (2011: 33), Anderson (2011: 276) and others,
language endangerment is on the rise, and variation as a result of endangerment is to become the norm, rather than the exception.

5.2 COMMUNITY EMPOWERMENT

A full discussion of the appropriate ethical model for fieldworkers in linguistics working with communities is far outside of the scope of this exercise, but it will suffice to say that community empowerment is something that at least this researcher believes is an ethical responsibility. As Rice (2006: 140) cogently argues,

> Ethical behaviour towards communities involves seeking permission from the relevant body within the community, ensuring that this body understands the research…and working out issues concerning ownership of material.

Rice (2006: 142-3) also makes an excellent distinction between work that is “done for the community and with the approval and support of the community”, as opposed to “with the community”, where researcher and collaborator work “together as co-workers in the research, hopefully toward a common goal”. In the research leading up to this thesis, I was ably supported by members of the community, who were not coerced into collaboration in any way; as observed in Chapter 1, other members of the community were free to decide against participating in the Peskisa. Nonetheless, I remain unsure as to whether I can truly declare this thesis completed “with the community”, since all three collaborators who took part in the research remain unclear about the aims and product of the research, and as such cannot have been said to have been working “toward a common goal”. Such a distinction is crucial if an empowerment model is to be adopted in documentary linguistics: no empowerment takes place if the researcher is the one who selects the project and research, and community involvement is limited to ‘providing’ the language to the researcher through
elicitation. Future efforts similar to this one should thus explore how the community can be more actively involved in such research without jeopardizing the attention to quality and rigor demanded of such an academic exercise.
REFERENCES


